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This paper proposes a contingent claims model to value a ￿rm￿ s debt
and equity as functions of observable book values appearing in published
￿nancial statements. Equity fair value critically depends on expected
earnings, equity book value and earnings volatility, because of the options
to default or to voluntarily liquidate the ￿rm. Debt value increases in
earnings volatility in the proximity of default. Default is triggered by the
erosion of equity due to negative earnings. Debt and equity values are
materially a⁄ected by the strength of the mean reversion of pro￿tability.
Voluntary liquidation before default may be optimal and it entails that a
sudden sharp decline in pro￿tability can be less detrimental to creditors
than a slower but persistent one.
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This paper presents a contingent claims model to value a ￿rm￿ s equity and
debt as functions of observable book values that appear in ￿nancial statements.
This model attempts to make fuller use of information in ￿nancial statements
than the existing structural models in literature do. This attempt has practical
advantages.
The model is based on observable earnings. Market values of assets and
equity are driven by expected earnings, which is consistent with the theory and
with the way equity analysts value equity. But market values of assets and equity
also depend on the equity holders￿option to default or to voluntarily liquidate
the ￿rm. Multiples like price-earnings and price-to-book are endogenous to the
analysis: a feature that can be used in model calibration. Since the model is
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1based on book values, it is immediately applicable even to ￿rms whose stock
is not traded in the market. The focus on book values permits to model the
dividend policy and debt covenants more accurately than in existing structural
models. In fact debt covenants are normally expressed in terms of book values.
Default is also made to depend on book values. The model is consistent with
the way accounting ratios are used to predict bankruptcy. No estimate of the
unobservable market value of the ￿rm is required. Rather the unobservable
market value of the ￿rm￿ s assets is endogenous to the model. The earnings
process is consistent with empirical evidence: return on assets is mean reverting
and negative operative earnings are possible.
All these advantages come at the cost of not having closed form solutions
for debt and equity values. Instead numerical solutions are necessary, but the
computations are a⁄ordable.
The model provides theoretical insights. The options to default or liquidate
the ￿rm cause equity value to exceed the present value of expected future earn-
ings. This is especially true in the proximity of default. Earnings volatility
increases equity value and typically decreases debt value. But debt value tends
to increase in earnings volatility in the proximity of default. This somehow chal-
lenges the assets-substitution argument, which suggests that near default the
risk-shifting incentive is strongest. Equity value materially increases (decreases)
with the strength of the mean reversion of pro￿tability, when pro￿tability is be-
low (above) its long term level. Debt value typically rises with the strength of
pro￿tability mean reversion.
It may be in the equity holders￿interest to voluntarily liquidate the ￿rm
before default. This implies that a slow decline in pro￿tability and small persis-
tent losses may be more dangerous for debt holders than a sudden large decline
in pro￿tability and sudden large losses. The reason is that sudden losses would
trigger voluntary liquidation, while small persistent ones would lead to default.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the relevant
literature. Then the valuation model is presented. Then the e⁄ect of possible
voluntary liquidation is analysed. The conclusions follow.
2 Literature
Most theoretical structural models, e.g. Leland (1994, 1998), Leland and Toft
(1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996),
Goldstein-Ju-Leland (2001), make limited use of the accounting numbers avail-
able in published ￿nancial statements. Typically they just use the book value
of outstanding debt and cash ￿ ows or earnings from operations. Instead the
building block of the model in this paper is the stochastic process of the return
on assets. This starting point is similar to that in Brennan and Schwartz (1984).
But the process of the return on assets is here assumed to be mean reverting
in keeping with the relevant empirical literature, e.g. Fama and French (2000)
and Penman and Nissim (2001).
The model endogenously prices the option to default implicit in equity prices.
2This seems important in light of the empirical evidence in Brockman and Turtle
(2003), who show that stock prices imply that equity is much better modelled
as a down-and-out call option than as a simple European call option. In other
words default barriers are economically and statistically signi￿cant in equity
valuation.
The model of this paper has also been inspired by Davydenko (2005), who
provided empirical evidence about the level and determinants of the default
barrier. He found that liquidity and access to external ￿nance were important
determinants of default. The higher is the liquidity the lower the ￿rm￿ s market
value at default. As suggested by his results, also in this paper default can take
place at di⁄erent possible ￿rm values.
The model can also explain the determinants of the voluntary liquidation
decision. Voluntary liquidation is a prominent phenomenon even for ￿rms whose
stock is publicly traded as reported in a series or empirical papers by Erwin and
McConnell (1997), Mehran-Nogler and Schwartz (1998), Sullivan-Crutchley and
Johnson (1997), Hite-Owers and Rogers (1987), Kim and Schatzberg (1987).
Voluntary liquidation is bene￿cial to creditors.
3 The valuation model
This section introduces a contingent claims valuation model based on the book
values of earnings, equity and debt observable in published ￿nancial statements.
Hereafter V is the market value and A the book value of the ￿rm￿ s equity. D
is the market value and F the face value of the ￿rm￿ s debt. F is assumed to
be constant over time. The building block of the model is the annualised rate
of return on the book value of assets (ROA), which we denote with R. To ￿x
ideas we denote the present date with t0 and set equally spaced future times ti
with i = f1;::;1g and with ti ￿ ti￿1 = ￿. ￿ could be arbitrarily small. At





￿, since EBIT at ti is assumed equal to ROA at ti times
the book value of assets at ti￿1, which is Ati￿1 + F. At any time ti the ￿rm
has to pay interest equal to cF￿. R is assumed to follow a continuous process
that only becomes observable at times ti, when earnings are recorded. The real
world process for R is assumed to be
dR = a(b0 ￿ R)dt + ￿dz (1)
where ￿ is the volatility parameter and dz is the di⁄erential of a Wiener process.
This process for R is consistent with the empirical evidence that documents
mean reverting pro￿tability and possible operating losses. In fact R can become
negative according to equation 1. In the risk-neutral world R follows the process
dR = a(b ￿ R)dt + ￿dz: (2)






Hereafter we are just concerned with the risk-neutral process of R for valuation
purposes. At any time ti equity holders receive an amount of dividends equal
to









where 1Ati￿1>A￿ is the indicator function of the event Ati￿1 > A￿. This equation
states that all EBIT net of interest, if positive, is distributed as dividends,
provided that the book value of equity Ati￿1 is higher than the level A￿. A￿ may
be determined by a debt covenant requiring a minimum level of retained earnings
or by the company law requirement that the ￿rm maintain a minimum share
capital level as a pre-condition for the ￿rm to be able to distribute dividends.
At any time ti the change in the book value of equity is





















This equation states that when the book value of equity is lower than A￿, divi-
dends cannot be distributed and all positive net earnings are retained. Negative
earnings erode the book value of equity. Equity book value represents a bu⁄er
of reserves that enables the ￿rm to absorb losses. It is worth stressing that
equation 5 implies that negative earnings erode the book value of the ￿rm￿ s
assets and hence the scale operations. Instead positive earnings, in so far as
they are retained, increase assets and hence the scale of operations.
Equations 4 and 5 imply that at any time ti equity holders receive a payo⁄
Qti equal to









is the change in equity value due the change in









= 0, dti 6= 0.
The ￿rm may default at any time ti. The majority of the literature on
structural models assumes that equity holders inject funds into the ￿rm and
that default it triggered when equity holders stop such injections as the market
value of equity V drops to 0. Although a tractable assumption, this does not
seem the way default is actually triggered, especially in the case of ￿rms whose
stock is traded in the market. Thus here we abstract from equity injections.
If equity holders do not inject funds into the ￿rm, V cannot become negative.
Thus we assume that default is triggered when losses have eroded the book value
of equity down to the level A￿￿. For now we set A￿￿ = 0, so that default takes
place as soon as
Ati ￿ 0: (7)
4This condition is roughly consistent with the provisions of the Belgian, Italian
and Swedish bankruptcy codes, which envisage the erosion of share capital as a
condition for triggering bankruptcy or liquidation and is also somewhat consis-
tent with the UK, German, French and Swiss codes, which refer to the excess
of liabilities over assets as a condition to trigger bankruptcy (see Altman and
Hotckiss (2006) at chapter 2). Condition 7 is also consistent with positive net
worth debt covenants, which are discussed for example in Leland (1994). At
default the ￿rm￿ s assets are liquidated and the recovery value of debt is
D￿￿
ti = min((Ati + F)(1 ￿ ￿);F) (8)
where ￿ denotes proportional bankruptcy costs. Liquidation proceeds net of
liquidation costs are (Ati + F)(1 ￿ ￿). So liquidation proceeds depend on the
book value of assets and are used to pay debt at the face value F. The absolute
priority rule is applied.
In the present setting the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that











a(b ￿ R) ￿ rV + ￿ (t ￿ ti) ￿ Qti = 0 (9)
lim
R!￿1
V (R;A;t) ! 0 (10)
lim
R!1
V (R;A;t) ! 1 (11)
V (R;A = 0;ti) = 0 (12)
V (R;A;ti = 100) = max((Ati + F)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ F;0) (13)
where ￿ (t ￿ ti) denotes Dirac￿ s delta function. The ￿rst condition states that,
because of limited liability, the market value of equity tends to 0 as the return
on assets becomes in￿nitely negative. The second condition states that the
market value of equity tends to in￿nity as the return on assets tends to in￿nity.
The third condition states that the market value of equity vanishes to 0 when
its book value is completely eroded and default is triggered. The ￿rm can be
liquidated only on the dates ti, since just on such dates earnings are recorded
as well as the erosion of the book value of equity. The ￿nal condition states
that after 100 years equity holders liquidate the ￿rm￿ s assets and pay F to debt
holders, in so far as liquidation proceeds su¢ ce. This terminal condition seems
a reasonable approximation of the fact that equity is typically a perpetuity. By











a(b ￿ R) ￿ rD + ￿ (t ￿ ti) ￿ ￿ ￿ cF = 0 (14)
lim
R!￿1










D(R;A = 0;ti) = F (1 ￿ ￿) (17)
D(R;A;ti = 100) = min((Ati + F)(1 ￿ ￿);F) (18)
The ￿rst condition states that when the return on assets approaches minus
in￿nity, the market value of debt approaches 0 because the liquidation value
of assets is completely eroded. The second condition states that debt becomes
default free as the return on assets approaches in￿nity. The third condition
states that debt value is equal to the recovery value of assets when the book
value of equity becomes 0. The ￿nal condition states that after 100 years the ￿rm
is liquidated and debt holders recover the face value of debt if the liquidation
proceeds are su¢ cient.
There exists no known closed form solution to equations 9, 14 and to the
respective conditions. Thus we need to resort to the implicit ￿nite di⁄erence
method to solve the equations numerically. Next the predictions of the numerical
solutions to above equations are illustrated.
3.1 Model predictions
Simulations using the above model provide theoretical insights, which are now
examined. Figure 1 shows the value of equity V in a base case scenario that
assumes ￿ = 0:05, a = 0:1, b = 0:1, r = 0:05, F = 1, A￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 0:2, c = 0:06.
Choosing 120 time steps per year (i.e. ￿ = 1=120) in an implicit ￿nite di⁄erence
grid guarantees the numerical stability of the solution. In fact, although the
￿nite di⁄erence algorithm is unconditionally stable, rounding errors may cause
instability if fewer time steps are used. Figure 1 shows that the market value of
equity V rises with the return on assets R and with the book value of equity A.
The primary reason is that expected future earnings rise in R and A. Expected
earnings rise in A, since default becomes less likely. Of course the probability
of default decreases in R and A.
V rises with the long-term level b of expected future earnings. It is worth
mentioning that b depends not only on real world long term earnings expecta-
tions, but also on ￿, the risk premium demanded by the market for exposure
to R-induced risk. Generally V rises with the variance of expected earnings,
since V is convex in R. The variance of earnings rises in the parameter ￿ and
decreases in the mean reversion parameter a. Thus V rises in ￿, while the e⁄ect
of a on V mainly depends on the e⁄ect of a on the level of expected earnings. As
Figure 1.b suggests, V will typically decrease (increase) in a when R is greater



























Equity book value A
Figure 1: Market value of equity V as a function of return on assets R and equity book value A.



















































Book value of equity A
Figure 1.b: Market value of equity V as a function of profitability R and book value of equity A (mean reversion parameter a = 0.5)





















































Book value of equity A
Figure 2: Market value of debt D as a function of return on assets R and book value of equity A.























As expected, V decreases in the interest rate r. The parameter A￿ captures
the level of A below which the ￿rm does will not distribute any dividends.
Equity value V typically decreases in A￿, because the constraint on the dividend
policy becomes tighter as A￿ rises. Overall Figure 1 suggests that the price-to-
book ratio V=A, a popular measure to characterise stocks, should be carefully










Figure 2 displays the results for debt market value D in the base case sce-
nario. D rises with pro￿tability as measured by R and with the size of the equity
cushion A. D rises in b, since expected future earnings rise in b, and decreases
in the bankruptcy cost parameter ￿. D rises in A￿, since the dividend policy
is less generous as A￿ rises and generally decreases in the variance of earnings,
i.e. in ￿. This is the case in the region where D is concave in R and A, which
is when default is a relatively remote prospect. But D can also increase in ￿,
especially when default is imminent. This is con￿rmed by Figure 2, which shows
how D becomes convex in R when R and/or A are low and default becomes a
more likely prospect. It is such convexity that causes debt D to increase in ￿.
Convexity is caused by the fact that the ￿rm does not default as soon as its
earnings turn negative, but only after its equity reserves have been completely
eroded by losses. It follows that the risk-shifting argument in the proximity of
default, suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is not really convincing in






























Book value of equity A
Figure 2.b: Market value of debt D as a function of profitability R and book value of equity A (mean reversion parameter a = 0.5).























The mean reversion parameter a a⁄ects debt value D because it a⁄ects
expected earnings as well as the volatility of future earnings. As shown in
Figure 2.b, generally D tends to rise in a, since expected future earnings would
increase and earnings volatility would decrease.
The simulations of this section highlight the material impact on debt and
equity values of mean reversion in pro￿tability.
3.2 When the book value of equity can turn negative
Up to know we have maintained the assumption that bankruptcy is triggered as
soon as the book value of equity turns negative. In some jurisdictions, notably
in the U.S., ￿rms can keep trading even though the book value of equity has
turned negative. Now we consider this case. As a benchmark, it is instructive
to consider the extreme case whereby default and bankruptcy can only take
place when the ￿rm￿ s assets have been totally depleted. This would be the
case of a ￿rm whose assets can all be quickly turned into cash and the cash
can be used to honour debt service and absorb the operating losses. Although
not such an extreme case, L.A.Gear￿ s bankruptcy is a case in point as illus-
trated by DeAngelo-DeAngleo and Wruck (2002). L.A.Gear was able to stave
o⁄ bankruptcy for years because it could liquidate its assets and at the time of
bankruptcy creditors were left with very few assets.
Figures 3 and 4 show the results for equity and debt values assuming base



























Book value of equity A
Figure 3: Market value of equity V as a function of profitability R and book value of equity A. A can be negative.

























as the book value of assets drops to the level A￿￿ such that A￿￿ + F = 0. As
before V is guaranteed to be non-negative if equity holders do not inject funds
into the ￿rm to stave-o⁄ distress.
Figure 3 shows how equity value V becomes concave in A when A < 0 and
R is relative high. In fact, when the book value of equity is negative because of
accumulated losses, but pro￿tability has recovered so that R is high, equity is
still valuable because of the positive earnings that are expected in the future.
In this situation an increase in the variance of earnings is detrimental to equity
holders as is underscored by the local concavity of V in A. In fact higher
earnings variance makes it more likely that new losses be incurred that would
further erode A and trigger bankruptcy, which would make equity worthless.
Figure 4 displays debt value as a function of R and A. When A = A￿￿ = ￿F,
the ￿rm￿ s assets drop to 0 and debt becomes worthless. When A < 0 debt value
can still be very high if pro￿tability as measured by R is high. Again this is
the case if previous losses have eroded the book value of equity but current
pro￿tability has sharply recovered.
In a less extreme default scenario than that of Figures 3 and 4, A￿￿ is greater
than ￿F and is determined by the drying up of the ￿rm￿ s liquid assets such as
cash and receivables. In this respect Davydenko (2005) highlights how liquidity
as measured by the quick ratio is an important determinant of the default event.
Indeed equity holders have all the interest to default as late as possible if
they do not inject new funds into the ￿rm. This is the case even when the book



























Book value of equity A
Figure 4: Market value of debt as a function of profitability R and equity book value A. A can be negative.























of the ￿rm￿ s trading, which entails agency costs of the type already described
in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997): leverage may lead equity holders, and
especially unscrupulous equity holders, to follow a non-￿rm value maximising
liquidation policy.
Of course in reality continuation until complete depletion of the ￿rm￿ s assets
is not observed. To prevent excessive continuation, among other things, are the
hopefully high ethical standard of equity holders or the fear of being accused of
wrongful trading.
Anyway the present analysis suggests the higher A￿￿ is, the safer and more
valuable debt is. Thus there may be a case in favour of company law provisions
that require a minimum level of the book value of equity in order for the ￿rm
to keep trading. Such provisions e⁄ectively set A￿ ￿ 0. In the absence of these
provisions equity holders may be tempted to incur losses in so far as the ￿rm￿ s
assets can be liquidated to postpone the state of insolvency.
3.3 Equity valuation: comparison with the practice
The above model suggests a way to use ￿nancial statements to value a ￿rm￿ s
stock. Also ￿nancial analysts use ￿nancial statements to values stocks, but they
employ simpler models. For example Penman (2003) suggests that, in its most
basic version, a ￿rm￿ s equity value at time t0 is given by the formula




11where ROE is constant and stands for the return on the book value of equity
and ￿ is the required return on equity in equilibrium. This formula poses the
well known problem of estimating ￿ and ignores the equity holders￿ s option to
default. By contrast the model in this paper assumes a mean reverting stochastic
process for the ￿rm￿ s pro￿tability, employs risk-neutral valuation and takes the
valuable default option into account. Thus the old problem of estimating ￿ is
substituted by the new problem of estimating the risk-neutral dynamics of assets
pro￿tability as measured by R. To contrast this valuation approach with the
traditional one, we can invoke the Feynman-Kac theorem. This tells us that, if














where the time t0 expectation Et0 [::] is with respect to the risk-neutral measure
and ￿ is the time of default. This risk-neutral valuation approach has the main
advantage to permit us to value the default option.
3.4 Distress prediction
The proposed model can also be used to predict default and bankruptcy. More
precisely the model can be used to estimate default probabilities over any time
horizon. Of course such probabilities would be calculated numerically and would
be based on the real rather than on the risk-neutral process of R. The model
can map default probabilities to the values of accounting ratios that can predict
default. For example, Zmijewski (1983) suggested that the ratios most useful,
if taken individually, to predict bankruptcy are:





- volatility of pro￿tability measured by the standard deviation of return on
equity, which is our model is driven by a and ￿ as well as leverage;
- ￿nancial leverage measured using the market value of equity; in our model
this measure of leverage corresponds to V=(F + V ).
3.5 Calibration, estimation and multiples
The calibration of the above model to market data is facilitated by the fact that
the model depends on observable book values. R, A, F are observable from pub-
lished ￿nancial statements. a, b and ￿ can be estimated from the time series of
earnings of the same or of similar companies. More di¢ cult it is to estimate these
parameters from the time series of the ￿rm￿ s stock price, mainly because the val-
uation equations can only be solved numerically. The risk premium ￿ can be set
to match the observed price-to-book or price-earnings multiples of the same ￿rm
or of similar ￿rms. Calibration to observed multiples is possible because debt
and equity values are expressed in terms of book values, in other words because
the model explains and predicts V=A and V=(Rti (F + Ati) ￿ cF). Calibration
12to multiples seems an advantage of the above model over existing structural
models in the literature.
It is worth highlighting that the predicted price-to-book ratio V=A critically
depends on the equity holders￿options to default. Ignoring such option leads
to undervaluing V and hence the price-to-book ratio V=A. This is especially
the case when present or expected future earnings are low and default is likely.
Other multiples can also be used in calibration. Moreover multiples have the
convenient property of usually following stationary processes over time.
3.6 Debt covenants
The proposed model is particularly suitable to estimate the impact of debt
covenants on the values of debt and equity. In fact the model is based on
book values and debt covenants are typically expressed in terms of book values.
Covenants intend to protect debt holders and are more frequent and stringent
in the case of loans than in the case of public bonds. Typical covenants require
that the interest cover ratio ( cF
Rti(Ati￿1+F)) or the book value of equity (Ati) be
above some minimum levels or that the book value of gearing ( F
Ati￿1+F ) be below
some maximum level. The violation of such protective covenants technically is a
default event and gives the creditor the right to demand immediate repayment
of principal and accrued interest. But the breach of a loan covenant normally
leads to debt renegotiation rather than bankruptcy ￿ling.
As for minimum net worth covenants, also company law may also impose a
minimum net worth level A￿￿. For example the ￿rm may have to stop trading
if its net assets fall persistently below the share capital level.
Often other debt covenants constrain dividend distributions on part of equity
holders. For example Smith and Warner (1979) document how covenants often
require that dividends not be distributed when A < A￿, where A￿ is a level
of the book value of equity set in the covenant. The higher A￿ is, the safer
debt is and the less valuable equity is. Typically company law imposes that
share capital cannot be distributed as dividends. Thus, even in the absence of
a covenant setting A￿, company law would set A￿ equal to the amount of share
capital.
As is apparent from the above discussion, common covenants can be easily
modelled in terms of the variables appearing in the model proposed above.
4 Voluntary liquidation and default
The proposed model can distinguish voluntary liquidations, whereby equity
holders or the board decide to liquidate the business, and defaults, which are
followed by forced liquidations. The previous section did not consider volun-
tary liquidation, but this section does. The omission of voluntary liquidation
may correspond to the case whereby managers do not act so as to maximise eq-
uity value. In fact Erwin and McConnell (1997) provide evidence that publicly
13traded ￿rms are typically voluntarily liquidated only if liquidation increases eq-
uity value and managers share in the bene￿t of liquidation through a signi￿cant
equity ownership stake.
If voluntary liquidation is possible and is decided so as to maximise equity
value, equity holders or the board liquidate the ￿rm at any time ti as soon as
V (Rti;Ati;ti) < max((Ati + F)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ F;0) (21)
where the right hand side of this inequality is the payo⁄ to equity holders in
case of liquidation at ti and the left hand side is the market value of equity in
case of continuation. Again the assumption is that liquidation proceeds are used
to pay debt at the face value F and that the absolute priority rule is strictly
enforced. Again equity holders do not inject funds into the ￿rm, so that V is
always non-negative. Notice that default is still possible since it may well be the
case that V (Rti;Ati;ti) ￿ max((Ati + F)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ F;0) up to a point where
Ati ￿ 0. As soon as Ati ￿ 0, again default and forced liquidation are triggered.
Voluntary liquidation introduces the following condition for the purposes of debt
valuation
1V (R;A;ti)<max((Ati+F)(1￿￿)￿F;0) ￿ [D(R;A;ti) = min((Ati + F)(1 ￿ ￿);F)]:
(22)
This condition states that when equity holders voluntarily liquidate the ￿rm￿ s
assets, debt holders recover the minimum between the face value of their credit
and the net liquidation proceeds.
Figure 5 shows the joint e⁄ect on equity value V of the options to default
and to liquidate the ￿rm voluntarily. In particular it may be rational for equity
holders to voluntarily liquidate the ￿rm before default. The probability of vol-
untary liquidation and the liquidation payo⁄ increase in A and decrease with
the size of liquidation costs. Notice that, to improve exposition, Figures 5 and
6 assume that ￿ = 0:4, while all other parameters as the same as in the base
case of the previous section.
4.1 Path to default and to voluntary liquidation
The model paradoxically predicts that, when equity book value A is high, debt
holders should fear a slow decline in pro￿tability more than a fast decline, be-
cause a slow decline increases creditors￿expected default loss. More precisely,
small persistent operative losses can harm creditors more than sudden huge op-
erative losses when the book value of equity is high. In fact, if A is high and
earnings rapidly plunge and turn signi￿cantly negative, equity holders will want
to liquidate the ￿rm immediately, whereupon creditors would receive the full
face value F = min((1 ￿ ￿)(A + F);F). But if, A being high, R decreases
slowly, equity holders will incur only moderate losses, which would not justify
immediate liquidation. Such moderate losses would progressively erode equity
book value A. A long period of moderate losses, during which it would be ratio-



























Book value of equity A
Figure 5: Market value of equity V as a function of profitability R and the book value of equity A. Voluntary liquidation is possible.



















































Book value of equity A
Figure 6: Value of debt D as a function of profitability R and book value of equity A. Voluntary liquidation is possible.























15assets recovery value (1 ￿ ￿)(A + F) below the debt face value F. Eventually
protracted losses could lead to default, forced liquidation and to a loss for debt
holders. This is why, when equity book value is high, a slow persistent decline
in the return on assets R can be more damaging to debt holders than a fast
decline. Instead, if A is low, immediate voluntary liquidation may not fetch
anything to equity holders, so that equity holders will not opt for voluntary
liquidation. In this case a rapid pro￿tability decline will mainly increase the
probability of default. This whole argument is implied by Figure 6.
5 Conclusions
This paper has presented a debt and equity valuation model based on book
values of assets, liabilities and earnings observable in published ￿nancial state-
ments. The valuation model provides a number of insights. Equity and debt
values critically depend on current and expected pro￿tability, on the book value
of equity and on the volatility of future earnings. Earnings volatility increases
equity value and typically decreases debt value. But debt value tends to increase
in earnings volatility in the proximity of default. This fact challenges the tradi-
tional assets-substitution and risk-shifting argument, which predicts that near
default the risk-shifting incentive is strongest. Equity value materially increases
(decreases) with the strength of pro￿tability mean reversion, when pro￿tability
is below (above) its long term level. Debt value typically rises with the strength
of pro￿tability mean reversion.
The proposed equity valuation model is based on book values and expected
earnings, but also accounts for the options to voluntarily liquidate the ￿rm or to
default, which seem important to value distressed equity. It may be in the equity
holders￿interest to voluntarily liquidate the ￿rm before default. Considering
voluntary liquidation entails, surprisingly, that a slow decline in pro￿tability
and small persistent losses may be more dangerous for debt holders than a
sudden large decline in pro￿tability and sudden large losses. Sudden losses
would trigger voluntary liquidation, while small persistent ones would lead to
default, which is more detrimental to debt holders than voluntary liquidation.
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